The parallels between 2009 and 2026 are well documented for All black peoplewith high ball security becoming the dominant issue after the three defeats to South Africa.
Similar to 2009, the Springboks beat the All Blacks 3-0 with Fourie du Preez and both Steyns repeatedly setting up high balls. The wingers at the time, Joe Rokokoko and Sitiveni Sivivatu, two Fijian speedsters known for their lethal runs, could not secure enough possession. The Boks fed on the resulting mistakes, which brought the set and territorial victories.
It sounds like a familiar story with the All Blacks needing to find similar solutions to the Springboks game.
The 2026 rivalry series has been defined by the All Blacks’ inability to control the catch area. Kicks became scrums, lost contests became second chances for South Africa.
All Blacks catch rate from high balls in play or contested restarts South Africa through four tests they were; 26 percent (4/15), 33 percent (5/15), 33 percent (4/12) and 30 percent (3/10).
Overall, they were caught only 30 percent of the time.
New Zealand he didn’t lose possession on every one of those balls that weren’t caught, most of them, but not all. Some were blown up by South Africa, some loose balls were recovered by the All Blacks.
But the catch rate is important as South Africa almost prefer to hammer the ball, as long as they can recover it and force a run. The only way to completely negate it is to catch the ball.
Will Jordan finished New Zealand’s best in the series with 7/14 South African high balls scattered at 50%. Jordie Barrett, known as one of New Zealand’s best bouncers, took 0/3 in the first Test and 3/6 in the second Test.
Barrett hit back repeatedly with the bat which unfortunately ended up in South Africa’s possession. Another tactic used by the All Blacks allowed Barrett to compete against his teammates. This caused multiple reversals with mid-air collisions.
The restart was a continuing problem for New Zealand with South Africa often attacking the middle or side of Tupou Vaa’i with the kick-off. He went 0/2 in aerial contests in the second Test and 0/3 in the third Test.
The wings as a unit caught about 50 per cent of the time, but it was elsewhere where the All Blacks really struggled. Cam Roigard was 0/2 in the series, Anton Lienert-Brown was 0/3 on contested high kicks. A shorter shot into the corner behind the arm often led to these situations where the winger wasn’t the one to tackle.
Catching a retreating player meant that the backfield was protected from dogfights. Ruben Love was needed in just one aerial contest the entire series, as was McKenzie at linebacker.
In the fourth Test, Josh Moorby was New Zealand’s best, taking two from three, but the smaller backline of Richie Mo’unga and Damian McKenzie came under pressure after the catch.
With Mo’unga or McKenzie needed to secure the breakdown, the Boks realized they could counter-handle any momentum against this smaller player. This led to a crucial call when the ball bounced out of hand and New Zealand were penalized for hands on the floor even though it landed off Mo’unga’s leg.
On the other side of the coin, the Springboks were equally poor in securing the high ball, with only Damian Willemse confident in the catch.
A missed opportunity for the All Blacks in this series was to use more of their own kicking.
In the second test, they won two out of two contested shots, in the third test four out of five, in the fourth test one out of one.
Despite this success, they persisted with long and deep kicks, and by the last Test, South Africa were winning most kick meters on return anyway.
Roigard’s management of territorial plays declined as the series wore on, the All Blacks guilty of playing too long phases in the middle zones, particularly between their 22 and half.
In the first Test, the kicking game in the last 20 minutes was what swung the game in favor of the All Blacks.
Will Jordan won an aerial challenge with a Springboks kick from the box and found a flying Damian McKenzie for a monster line break on the kick return. They ended up forcing a five meter run which led to a Luke Jacobson try. This momentum comes from transition, not phase play.
Quinn Tupaea produced a brilliant 50-22 from the first phase after a tackle that pinned the Boks deep, and although that next attacking opportunity was lost, the All Blacks were awarded another turnover. After that turnover, Jordie Barrett expertly took another rough tackle which the Springboks drew on the five meter line and the pressure led to a yellow card for Mark van Staden.
When the All Blacks chased the game in later Tests, they abandoned the territorial battle and were guilty of overplaying the phases. They were attacked at the breakdown and lost many possessions after a penalty from Malcolm Marx. Roigard’s sniping around the rucks led to multiple turnovers with players becoming isolated.
This is a big area for them to look at, as the rewards don’t come from playing endless phases in midfield zones.
Despite the awe surrounding Will Jordan’s 32-phase try in the fourth Test, few of the All Blacks’ tries came from long periods of the phase of the game.
In the first test, four tries came in three phases from the launch of the set-piece, the fifth being a strike against the Netherlands.
In the second test they produced two great strikes from midfield in the first half, tries from Cam Roigard and Damian McKenzie, both in two phases.
In the second half, Leroy Carter’s try came straight from the breakdown, a turnover at one stage. Only Ardie Save’s last-gasp try came from long-range in the South African 22, and this is the best place on the pitch to play big phases.
As the fourth test showed, they can score a large number of phases within the opposition’s 22, which is the safest place to do so.
But elsewhere the All Blacks are better suited to playing opening pieces where they can strike, rather than playing phases endlessly between the 22s in the midfield. More hitting can create those opportunities.
There needed to be more clearances from Roigard or attempts to find long grass and force the Boks to clear the lines and give the All Blacks a line. That’s actually what they often did in the first test.
Ruben Love was very good at timing his shot in this area, while Richie Mo’unga didn’t show it, only shooting once in the entire game.
Yes, they trailed on the scoreboard in the latter Test by two points, but there was plenty of time. They needed patience, the phase play was going nowhere and they received costly turnovers. The kicking game can open up scoring opportunities in transition and from their formations, which the All Blacks have already proven to be their best method of scoring.
If the All Blacks look at how they performed in the first test in the second half against everyone else, they will clearly see this difference and it is a big reason why they lost the series.
